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I.  WHAT CAUSED THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
  COURT IN INDONESIA? 
 
The Constitutional Court is a product of reform, especially in the 
institutional aspects of state in Indonesia. The existence of this institution 
has resulted in a new freshness in the political, democratic, and national life 
of Indonesia. The existence of the Constitutional Court serves as a fresh wind 
for each citizen, especially in protecting their basic rights against every action 
taken by the state that they deem to be inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The emergence of the Constitutional Court and its existence in the state 
administration reform of Indonesia has a long history. The author has 
analyzed all of this into several parts, namely: four waves regarding the 
presentation of law and the question regarding the two concepts of the state. 
Furthermore, it will analyze the authority of the Constitutional Court and 
how to position the Constitutional Court in the state administration reform 
process. Subsequently, at the end of this article, a conclusion will be drawn 
which is focused on the problematic nature of the Constitutional Court in the 
constitution and what exactly were the rationale behind the Bill on the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
II.  FOUR WAVES OF IDEAS REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
In the history of state administration in Indonesia, there was an 
evolution of ideas or thoughts regarding the importance of judicial 
institutions which verify laws against the constitution. The culmination point 
of this progress occurred in 2001 when the People’s Consultative Assembly, 
through the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, decided to establish a Constitutional Court in order to verify laws 
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 against the Constitution.1 This Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
serves as the final wave of a long struggle that commenced in 1945 in 
accomplishing the idea of establishing a constitutional state in order to 
achieve the objectives of the proclamation state. 
   The first wave occurred in the Session of the BPUPK in 1945 when 
this institution arranged a draft of the Constitution for the state.2 In this 
BPUPK session, Yamin, a member, proposed this draft. However, other 
members, including Soepomo, rejected this draft of the Constitution which 
was arranged by the BPUPK and taken over by and legalized by PPKI 
(Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence) on 18 August 
1945 as the proclamation constitution, did not attach the authority of the 
Constitutional Court to verify laws.3 The legislators of the 1949 RIS 
Constitution and 1950 UUDS (1950 Provisional Constitution) seemed to 
follow the idea of the founders and drafters of the 1945 Constitution and 
rejected the judicial authority to verify laws. 
   The second wave occurred when the Constituent Assembly elected at 
the 1955 General Election held their sessions during the period from 1957 to 
1958 in order to arrange and draft a new Constitution as the replacement for 
the 1950 UUDS. The session held by the Constituent Assembly approved a 
Constitutional Court to hold the authority for verifying laws and 
governmental actions by employing the 1945 Constitution as the benchmark 
for determining validity of laws and actions. Yet, it was canceled because 
President Soekarno, through the Presidential Decree dated 5 July 1959 re-
enacted the Proclamation Constitution of 17 August 1945 and dissolved the 
Constituent Assembly. This decree was deemed to have re-enacted the 1945 
Constitution which clearly did not allow for a Constitutional Court to verify 
laws and governmental regulations or actions. 
              The third wave occurred at the beginning of the New Order 
administration (1965-1970) and reached its culmination in 1970 when the 
DPR-GR together with the Government discussed Law No. 14 of 1970 
regarding the Principles of Judicial Authority as the replacement for Law No. 
19 of 1964.4 After 1970, until the collapse of the authoritarian regime of 
Soeharto in 1998, the debate regarding the issue of a Constitutional Court 
was not only on the back-burner but had largely been forgotten as an issue at 
all. The People’s Consultative Assembly elected at General Elections in the 
New Order era did not change its stance on this issue in spite of the growing 
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 aspirations of the community demanding the existence of judicial institutions 
to measure and verify laws that were potentially in breach of the provisions of 
the Constitution. 
   The final or fourth wave occurred when the MPR (People’s 
Consultative Assembly) elected at the 1999 General Election, the first 
democratically held election in the post-Soeharto era, discussed the 
amendment of 1945 Constitution. This occurred in the period from 1999 
through to 2004. The representatives of the parties and groups in the MPR 
deemed that it was necessary to tightly control the legislative and executive 
authority in order to prevent any violation against the norms existing in the 
Constitution. However, the representatives of parties and groups in the MPR, 
consist of groups which have persistently rejected the control of the 
legislative product in the form of law fall within the jurisdiction of a judicial 
body tasked with determining whether the law as conditio sine qua non for 
the sake of the accomplishment of principles of democratic legal country 
(constitutional government) as demanded by the reform movement. 
   The struggle between these two groups only ended after the third 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution, where it was agreed to delegate the 
authority to a judicial authority by establishing the Constitutional Court.5 
The stipulation in the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution specifies 
that the Constitutional Court is authorized to verify laws that are deemed to 
be in breach of the Constitution. In order to guarantee that this stipulation is 
implemented, the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution explicitly 
states that legislators have a deadline for the passage of a bill that will 
establish the Constitutional Court.6 
 
A.  The Controversy between the Two Concepts of the State 
The controversy of ideas and thoughts between the group demanding 
the existence of authority of a judicial body to verify laws and the group 
rejecting this idea in the four waves of state administration history of 
Indonesia as explained above, is actually closely related to the idea or concept 
of state (staatside) being adhered to.7 In general, there are two concepts 
regarding the state (staatside) which are very influential in the world and in 
practice among the supporters and followers of the two concepts which are 
competing and struggling for influence, including in Indonesia. These two 
competing concepts which influence the development of ideas in the area of 
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 state administration law is the idea of people sovereignty with constitutional 
supremacy,8 which is developed based on the concept of constitutional 
democratic government and the concept people’s sovereignty based on the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy (legislative supremacy).9 
  The controversy existing between the supporters of each idea 
regarding the state will in turn have a direct implication on the pattern of 
the relationship which is developed between the legislative power on the one 
hand and the judicial power on the other hand. The debate between the group 
rejecting and the one supporting the judicial body being authorized to verify 
laws is a reflection of the strict controversy between the supporters and 
followers of the two main concepts regarding the principle of people’s 
sovereignty.10 
 
B. The concept of People’s Sovereignty with Parliamentary Supremacy 
 The concept of parliamentary supremacy is the core of democracy.11 
According to the concept which adheres to the idea of the peoples’ sovereign 
state with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, the judicial review by 
the judicial body is a betrayal and represents disloyalty against the 
democratic principle where it is held that the highest sovereignty is in the 
hand of the people while the law is only a manifestation of demand by the 
sovereign people.12
 In such a doctrine of a state, the adagium Vox Populi, Vox Dei which 
means that what becomes of the decisions of the sovereign people, including 
the law or governmental regulations which are established based on the 
mandate provided by the people as the holder of that sovereignty, may not be 
assessed or annulled by any other institution.13 If there is another institution 
which may verify, assess, and annul the law established by people as the 
holder of that sovereignty, it means the highest sovereignty is not absolutely 
held by people or its representatives which are elected through a democratic 
mechanism, instead, it is in the hands of the institution which has the 
authority to annul the Law.14 
 Another argument that may be employed to refuse the 
institutionalization of the law verification system for alleged breaches of the 
Constitution through the judicial authority is that, theoretically, there was 
no scientific basis that corroborated the authority of verifying the law, either 
the basis following the Marshall model that delegates the authority of 
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 verifying the law to the Constitutional Court or the one following the Kelsen 
model that delegates the authority to a Board following the French model 
that is then delegated to the judicial authority. The followers of the 
parliamentary supremacy concept do not refuse at all the thesis made by 
Marshall and Kelsen regarding the necessity of limiting and controlling the 
authority of legislators in order to prevent the misuse of authority by this 
institution. Including, that the Constitution is a legal norm15 of a state in the 
highest position among the existing legal norms and that it should be fully 
protected. The followers of the parliamentary supremacy doctrine do not 
refuse the concept of constitutionalism which necessitates all state 
authorities, including the legislative authority to be limited and controlled as 
being suggested by the supporters of the concept of constitutional supremacy. 
Limitation and control against the legislative authority should be significant. 
However, it should be performed by the legislators themselves and not by 
other state institutions. The law verification system as a form of control 
against the legislator may be justified as long as it is performed by the 
legislators themselves or the people through its representatives which are 
elected through a democratic General Election process. It has become a kind 
of ironic law in the countries adhering to the concept of people’s sovereignty 
such as England, Netherlands, and France.16 
 
C. Concept of People’s Sovereignty with Constitutional Supremacy 
    The emergence of the peoples’ sovereign state with constitutional 
supremacy is a phenomena that started to occur in the early 19th century as 
the anti-thesis against the concept of peoples’ sovereign state with 
parliamentary supremacy which was practiced in some European countries 
over the several centuries previous to this. In reality, the concept of the 
peoples’ sovereign state with parliamentary supremacy is frequently 
accompanied by negative excesses, such as the misuse of authority by the 
parliament in legislating the law due to ineffective control against the 
authority of legislators. In practice, the Constitution as the highest legal 
norm in limiting the authority of legislators is not as effective as if it was not 
accompanied by a concrete mechanism regarding and by which the legislative 
body’s products are verified and measured as to whether they are in 
accordance with the norms existing in the Constitution. How, for instance, if 
in practice, there is a law that violates the norms of the Constitution. Without 
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 the existence of such a mechanism, then the Constitution will only function 
as a historic document containing the declaration of independence, yet having 
no concrete meaning due to the lack of a mechanism which may force every 
state administrator, especially the legislative body to abide by the 
Constitution and to impose sanctions for any violation of the provisions that 
it contains. 
   According to the concept which demands the peoples’ sovereign state 
based on the Constitutional Supremacy doctrine, this institutionalization of 
authority for verifying laws that are deemed to be in breach of the 
Constitution is frequently called constitutional democracy—a conditio sine 
qua non, an absolut thing serving as the most effective means in limiting the 
state’s authority in casu the authority of the legislators.17 In other words, the 
idea of a constitutional state (constitutionalism) may only be achieved 
through the institutionalization of a law verification system by a judicial 
institution. The main idea in the concept of a constitutional state is that there 
are always three main branches of the state’s authority. And of the three 
branches of the state’s authority there is not any one branch beyond the 
control of a legal institution, including the legislative authority. The state 
adhering to the concept of peoples’ sovereign state with Constitutional 
Supremacy doctrine does not only establish the Constitution as the superior 
norm but also necessitates the existence of an effective mechanism for 
assessing and verifying the quality of each established Law.18 The 
institutionalization of authority for verifying the Law is an effective method 
to be applied that the norms stipulated in the Articles of the Constitution 
may not serve as dead letters. 
   In the countries adhering to this concept of a democratic constitution, 
the law verification system has been appropriately institutionalized. There 
are some countries that delegate the control against legislative authority to a 
Constitutional Court, following the Marshall model in the state 
administration system of the USA and some other countries delegate it to a 
separate institution outside of the Supreme Court, such as a Constitutional 
Court in order to follow the Kelsenian model such as in the state 
administration system applied by Germany. Some countries delegate such 
control to a distinctive institution beyond the judicial authority, such as 
Constitutional Board such as in the state administration system applied by 
France. This Constitutional Board is autonomous in nature19 and not part of 
 52
 the political power. Despite the forms of institutionalization of law 
verification systems in each country, each country is different due to the 
different social and political backgrounds of these countries, however, 
intrinsically they become the principles in administering the country that the 
authority of legislators should be controlled in order that these powers do not 
become arbitrary. In the context of Indonesia, in order that such control may 
be more effective, it should be applied effectively by an institution, namely 
the Constitutional Court with various ideas of its establishment and the 
authority of the Constitutional Court itself. 
 
III. THE IDEA OF THE ESTABLISHMENT BEHIND THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
   The idea of establishment of a Constitutional Court is discussed in two 
parts, namely: the idea of Constitutionalism and the authority of the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
A. The Idea of Constitutionalism 
   The establishment of a Constitutional Court in each country is 
triggered for a variety of reasons, however in general, the establishment of a 
Constitutional Court is initiated by a process of political change from 
authoritarian power into democracy. The rejection of authoritarianism has an 
impact on the demand for a democratic state administration which 
appreciates human rights.20 Likewise, for the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court in Indonesia. Basically, the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court may not be separated from the past experiences in the 
administration of the authoritarian regime, essentially a closed power that 
does not respect human rights. The idea of establishing the Constitutional 
Court is motivated by a desire to have better administration of authority and 
state administration. There are at least four triggers for the foundation of a 
Constitutional Court; namely, (1) as a development of the constitutionalism 
concept, (2) a checks and balances mechanism; (3) clean and transparent 
state administration, and 4) protection for human rights. 
 
1. The Idea of Constitutionalism 
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   The Concept of Constitutionalism is a concept that seeks to provide a 
limitation on authority. This concept has two elements. The first element is 
the concept of a legal state where the legal power universally controls the 
state’s authority, and in this respect, the law performs as a control of politics. 
The second element is the concept of citizen civil rights or the stating that the 
freedom of citizens is guaranteed by the constitution and the state’s authority 
is limited by the constitution, and this authority must be legitimized by the 
constitution.21 Institutionalization of the Constitutional Court is the 
implementation of the constitutionalism concept, demanding the existence of 
power limitations and this institution obtains a mandate from the 
constitution to settle the problems relating to the constitution and state 
administration. 
 
2. As A Checks and Balances Mechanism 
  One of the characteristics of a proper governmental system is the 
existence of a checks and balances mechanism in the implementation of 
authority. The existence of this checks and balances mechanism will enable 
the mutual control between the existing branches of authority while 
endeavoring to prevent hegemonic, tyrannical actions, and the centralization 
of authority. The implementation of the checks and balances principle is 
required to ensure that there is no overlap among the existing authorities. By 
referring to the principle of a legal state, then the relevant control system is 
judicial control. The position of the Constitutional Court as a part of the 
judicial authority (judicative authority), will encourage the development of 
the checks and balances mechanism in state administration. 
 
3. Clean and Good Government 
  A proper governmental system necessitates the existence of clean, 
transparent, and participative state administration. The Constitutional Court 
is an authority which may be positioned to perform this type of accountability 
control against public officials in the performance of their duties and 
functions, in this sense there will always be a reference to the morality and 
the interest of citizens. 
 
4. Protection of Human Rights 
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   Unlimited authority frequently leads to the performance of arbitrary 
actions in state administration and violations of human rights. The 
Constitutional Court is a branch of authority which functions to maintain 
state administration in order that it always refers to democratic principles as 
well as respecting and protecting human rights. 
 
B.  The Authority of the Constitutional Court  
  In accordance with the stipulation in Article 24C of the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court has the authority to list hearings in both the first 
and final instance. In essence, the decisions handed down by the 
Constitutional Court are final and binding when dealing with matters within 
its jurisdiction such as constitutional validity of laws and the outcomes of 
general elections. In addition the Constitutional Court is also to decide 
matters where the House of Representatives alleges violations of the 
Constitution by either the President or Vice-President. 
  If traced from the debate of PAH I MPR, the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court cannot actually be separated from the political context 
of the dismissal of President Abdurrahman Wahid by the MPR in the 2001. 
The process and mechanism of this dismissal have much affected the idea of 
the establishment of the Constitutional Court, that the dismissal of a 
President should be performed legally in accordance with legal regulations 
and not arbitrarily. Starting form the dismissal of a President and/or Vice-
President, it subsequently appeared that the idea of providing another 
authority to the Constitutional Court in this regard was warranted. 
  The main function of the Constitutional Court is to maintain the 
consistent performance of the Constitution and that this is done responsibly 
by each state administrator. Furthermore, that it must be implemented in 
policies forms which are in accordance with the demands of people and the 
aspirations of democracy. The function of the Constitutional Court is reflected 
in the authority explained above. However, in relation to the administration 
of the assigned authority, there are still some problems to be settled and 
others that must be anticipated. 
  Before discussing the problems, we should observe the following 
table: 
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(1) Verification of laws in Violation of the Constitution 
Type Verification of Legal 
System 
Mechanism of 
verification 
1. Formale toetsingsrecht
2. Materieele 
toetsingsrecht  
1. Constitutional  
Court. 
2. Supreme Court  
1. There are some 
problems. 
2. Performed by an 
institution. 
 
 
(2) Settlement of Disputes on the Authority Among State Institutions 
Constitutional authority against 
two institutions  
The institutions as the authority of 
Constitutional Court  
House of Representatives and 
President. 
1.  The state institutions specified in 
the constitution. 
2.   State institutions the authority of 
which is not specified by the state. 
 
(3) Decision on the Dissolution of a Political Party 
Principle The freedom of association Process  
1. Democratic 
principle. 
2. Human rights 
principle. 
1. Political party. 
2. Ambivalence of 
Constitution. 
1.  To prioritize the 
equality. 
2.  To uphold the truth. 
3.  Justice is not based on 
the ruler’s  will. 
 
 
(4) Disputes Regarding the Outcome of the General Election 
General Election Settlement of conflict by the 
Constitutional Court 
1.  What type of election. 
2.  At what level is the dispute on 
the outcome of the general 
election may become the 
authority of  the Constitutional 
Court. 
1. It should be considered regarding 
time limits. 
2. Who has the right to submit the 
claim. 
3. Who is being claimed against.  
 
(5) Impeachment 
Duty of Constitutional 
Court 
Types of Breach Process of Investigation
To provide the verdict 
in relation to the 
judgment of the 
1.  President and Vice 
President are alleged 
to have committed a 
1. To try and decide on 
the judgment of 
House of 
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 House of 
Representatives 
that the President 
and Vice President 
has committed a 
breach of law. 
  
breach of law in the 
form of betrayal 
against the state, 
corruption, bribery, 
other severe criminal 
acts, and shameful 
deeds. 
2. President and Vice 
President do not 
meet the criteria to 
become the President 
and Vice President. 
Representatives no 
later than 90 days 
after the receipt of 
the application by 
the Constitutional 
Court (Article 7B(4) 
of the Constitution. 
2. In accordance with 
the change of system 
and state 
administration 
structure being 
developed in 
Indonesia. 
Source:Author. 
 
1.      Judicial Review against the Constitution22
   The authority for verifying laws in breach of the Constitution 
(judicial review), theoretically and practically include two types, namely 
formal verification (formale toetsingrecht) and material verification 
(materielle toetsingrecht). The formal verification is an authority of assessing 
whether or not a legislative product is produced in accordance with the 
prevailing procedures. While a material verification is an authority to 
examine and measure whether or not a legal regulation contradicts with a 
higher level regulation, as well as whether or not an authority has the right 
to establish a certain regulation.23 In this context, the formulation of the 
Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution Article 24C(1) does not limit the 
right of verification. The limitation is the subject to be verified or measures as 
specifically noted in the limitation of the law. 
   In the legal system of Indonesia, there are two institutions that have 
the authority to perform verification on legal regulations; the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court.24 The Constitutional Court has the authority 
of verifying law deemed to be in breach of the Constitution and the Supreme 
Court has the authority to verify legal regulations under prevailing laws. It is 
not so clear regarding the consideration in differentiating Judicial Review 
against the Constitution and regulations below the law. 
   The mechanism for verifying legal regulations under the 
abovementioned model is likely to produce problems. First, the vision of 
integrity and the concept of law or legal regulation enforcement, as there are 
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 two institutions having authority for these matters, it is fair to say that any 
divergence between the institutions will be manifested as the problems noted 
above. Second, this verification model may lead to inconsistency or verdicts 
that contradict with legal regulations. What if a Governmental Regulation is 
declared not to contradict with a law by the Supreme Court while the 
Constitutional Court declares that the law serving as the “umbrella” covering 
the Governmental Regulation does not contradict with the Constitution. 
   Ideally, the verification of legal regulations is performed by an 
institution that may avoid the inconsistency of verdicts while at the same 
time allowing the explicit vision and legal conception to be upheld. Therefore, 
in order to prevent this problem, there is a need for a mechanism which may 
serve as a bridge between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in 
the process of verification so that there are consistent verdicts handed down 
by both Courts. 
 
2. Dispute Settlement on Authority Among State Institutions 
   One of authorities of the Constitutional Court is to settle the disputes 
relating to the authority among state institutions, which are stipulated in the 
Constitution. There are two requirements that must be satisfied before the 
Constitutional Court can exercise its authority; there is a state institution 
and the authority of this institution is stated in the Constitution. The 
conception of a state institution, the authority of which is specified by the 
Constitution, may invite various interpretations25. This is because the 
amended Constitution has no clear conception regarding state institutions,26 
particularly when one considers the emergence of many new institutions, 
either the ones specified in the Constitution and those not expressly stated in 
the Constitution. At last count there were at least nine state institutions the 
authority of which is specified in the Constitution; namely, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly;27 House of Representatives; Local House of 
Representatives; President; Supreme Court; Constitutional Court; Finance 
Audit Agency; and Judicial Commission.28 Meanwhile, there are many state 
institutions the authority of which is not directly stated in the Constitution, 
examples of which include the National Commission of Human Rights, the 
National Ombudsman Commission (KON), KPKPN, and others. 
   The meaning regarding state institutions the authority of which is 
stated in the Constitution may certainly lead to various interpretations as to 
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 which institution will fall under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
For instance; whether the Constitutional Court also has the authority to 
settle disputes arising between Local Governments and the Central 
Government, and also disputes among Local Governments themselves. The 
authority is indeed present and generally referred to in the Constitution. 
However, it is important to clarify whether or not the Local Government and 
Municipality/City belong to the category of state institution or not.29 In some 
countries such as South Africa, South Korea, Germany, the Russian 
Federation, the Czech Republic, and Yugoslavia, the authority of the 
Constitutional Court also includes disputes between Central Government and 
Local Government and among the Local Governments. 
 
3. Decision on the Dissolution of a Political Party 
   In accordance with the mandate of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court also has the authority to decide on the dissolution of a 
political party. The problem is whether the dissolution of a political party 
contradicts with the principles of democracy and human rights. The 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution explicitly provides a guarantee of 
freedom and liberty for all citizens to associate and gather. One menas of 
giving effect to this guarantee is the right to form and be a member of a 
political party. This is an ambiguity in the Constitution where there is an 
apparent guarantee to freedom of association yet there are also provisions 
that permit the dissolution of political parties.  
   In some countries, such as Korea, the reasoning of dispersing a 
political party is explicit. Article 55 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of 
the Nation specifies that a political party may be dissolved in case the 
objective and activities performed by the political party contradict with the 
basic order of democracy. In Indonesia, the reasoning of dissolving a political 
party is specified in Law No. 31 of 2002 on Political Parties. A political party 
may be dissolved due to adhering, developing, disseminating, the doctrines or 
principles of Communism/Marxism/Leninism. This stipulation is very 
interpretative and has no a clear standard. What and how is the relevance 
between doctrines of Communism/Marxism/Leninism and the need to dissolve 
a political party? The following question is whether or not in a democracy 
such as Indonesia it is appropriate to dissolve political parties for their 
beliefs? The reasoning behind the dissolution of a political party in Indonesia 
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 is very discriminative, not in accordance with the spirit of pluralism, freedom, 
and democracy. 
 
4.  Disputes regarding the Outcome of General Elections 
   Another authority held by the Constitutional Court is to settle 
disputes regarding the outcome of general elections. The problem is what type 
of general elections does this include and on what level these disputes 
regarding the outcome of general elections may fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court. According to Article 22E(2), general elections are 
conducted to elect members of the House of Representatives, Local House of 
Representatives, President and Vice-President. This means that the 
Constitutional Court would have the requisite mandate to settle every 
dispute regarding the outcome of general elections for all types of general 
elections and for all levels of election.30 Is it sufficiently proportional to 
provide such an extensive authority, considering that the possibility of the 
Constitutional Court only exists in the central government, and besides, the 
number of Judges on the Constitutional Court is nine. It can be ascertained, 
the Constitutional Court will not be operating at a maximum level in trying, 
examining, and settling the disputes regarding the outcome of general 
elections, viewed from the possible number of cases being admitted and the 
percentage of cases that may be settled by the Constitutional Court with all 
its limitations. This is especially the case when one considers the euphoria of 
democracy is likely to see citizens demand that their rights be satisfied and 
these citizens will endeavor to exploit all of the judicial mechanisms available 
to them including the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there should be 
limitations against what level of disputes may be settled by the 
Constitutional Court, including a definition of time limits, and who shall have 
the right to impeach and be impeached. 
 
5.  Impeachment 
   The Constitutional Court is obliged to provide a verdict on the 
judgment of House of Representative, that the President and/or Vice 
President is alleged to have committed a breach of law and/or does not meet 
the qualification to become President and/or Vice President according to the 
Constitution. In reference to Article 7B(1) of the Constitution, the breach as 
stipulated consists of two things, First, that the President and/or Vice 
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 President is alleged to commit a breach of law in the form of betrayal against 
th state, corruption, bribery, other severe criminal actions, or unlawful deed. 
Second, the President and/or Vice President do not any longer meet the 
qualification to be President and/or Vice President. The process of examining, 
trying, and deciding on the judgment of the House of Representatives is to be 
no longer than 90 days after the request is received by the Constitutional 
Court (Article 7B(4) of the Constitution). 
   The involvement of the Constitutional Court in the process of the 
dismissal of President and/or Vice President cannot be separated from the 
past experience and constitutes a logical consequence of the changing system 
and state administration being developed in Indonesia. Besides, the 
eagerness to provide a limitation so that a President and/or Vice President 
will not be dismissed merely due to political convenience of the parliament. 
This should ensure that there is also an accountable legal basis and 
consideration for any dismissal action taken. Nevertheless, the concept which 
is developed by the Constitution in the process of dismissing the President 
and/or Vice President still leaves some problems unresolved, such as: First, 
the draft of the Constitution may still be interpreted arbitrarily by the ruling 
political interests, such as in the context of “other severe criminal actions” or 
“unlawful deeds”. Second, what and how is the investigation mechanism to be 
applied by the Constitutional Court in relation to the allegation which is 
meant by the House of Representatives, particularly as this relates to deeds 
relating to criminal acts. Is the 90-day period sufficient for investigating and 
deciding on the allegation of a breach by the President and/or Vice President 
considering the processes under the criminal procedure law necessitates the 
material truth for a case may take several months. Third, what is the binding 
nature of a verdict of the Constitutional Court to dismiss a President and/or 
Vice President when one considers that the verdict of the Constitutional 
Court should be conveyed by the House of Representatives to the People’s 
Consultative Assembly. There is a possibility that the People’s Consultative 
Assembly will annul the verdict of the Constitutional Court. 
 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN LEGAL REFORM 
 
   Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court which characterizes 
the enforcement of operational regulations on the administration of 
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 constitutional duties of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Ratification of this Law has opened an opportunity for the appointment of 9 
judges to the Constitutional Court for the first time in our history of state 
administration, namely: (1) Mohammad Laica Marzuki, (2) Soedarsono, (3) 
Maruarar Siahaan, (4) Jimly Assiiddiqie, (5) Achmad Rostandi, (6) I Gde 
Dewa Palguna, (7) H.A.S. Natabaya, (8) Muktie Fajar, and (9) Harjono. 
   Administratively, these nine (9) persons are appointed to be Judges of 
the Constitutional Court by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 147/M of 2003 
and dated 15 August 2004. They took a joint oath, which was witnessed by 
the ruling President at that time, Megawati Soekarnoputri, at the State 
Palace on 16 August 2004. This was exactly 1 day before the deadline 
specified by Article III of the Transitional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia. 
   Article III of the Transitional Provisions which are stipulated in the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies: “The Constitutional Court is 
to be established no later than 17 August, and prior to its establishment, all 
its authorities shall be performed by the Constitutional Court”. Therefore, 
besides the 13th, 15th, and 16th of August 2003, there is one more historic day 
for the Constitutional Court, 10 August 2002, the ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia specifying 
that as of that date, the authority of Constitutional Court has legally existed, 
however, provisionally executed by the Constitutional Court acting as the 
provisional executive of the Constitutional Court. 
   During the period between 10 August 2002 to 10 August 2003 the 
Registrar of the Supreme Court has registered 14 cases relating to the 
validity of laws submitted by a variety of community interests. These 14 cases 
are in accordance with the Transitional Provisions of Article 87 of Law No. 24 
of 2003, the investigation is assigned by the Supreme Court to the 
Constitutional Court no later than 60 days after the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court. 
   Closely related to the dispute on the outcome of general elections for 
electing the members of the various chambers of parliament in 2004, the 
Constitutional Court has received 448 allegations and 2 lawsuits from 1 pair 
of candidates for President/Vice-President. Of the 450 cases submitted only 
273 met the basic conditions to proceed including the President/Vice-
President claim. These 274 cases were consolidated into 45 bundles of 
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 applications, consisting of 23 applications from political parties, 21 
applications from the candidate members of the DPD, and 1 application from 
the President/Vice-President. Of the 448 cases regarding disputes on the 
outcome of the general election, the approved ones only relate to 40 cases; 2 
for the seats of DPD-RI, 4 for the seats of DPR-RI, 5 for the seats of the 
Provincial House of Representatives, and 29 for the seats of 
District/Municipality House of Representatives. 
   In these cases the law provides for 30 working days from the date of 
receipt for these matters to be resolved. The applications were received 
between 8 May and 22 June 2004. They were resolved in 28 days and the 
verdicts were handed down by the Court on 18 June 2004. 
   Similarly for the cases relating to the disputes first stage of the 
Presidential election the law provides for 14 working days for these matters 
to be resolved. The Court handed down their decision within 7 working days. 
   The existence of settlement mechanism for the dispute on the outcome 
of general elections should be welcomed. Though establishment of the 
Constitutional Court it’s has become clear that Indonesia has re-affirmed its 
determination to settle any kind of political dispute and conflict through legal 
procedures. In the abovementioned context, the Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshiddiqie declared as well as invited: 31
  
 From now on, let us stop various bad habits which are ‘anti-
democratic’ in nature, that is to settle various political street disputes 
and conflicts or releasing all political anger and envy that should have 
been done. We should settle all differences of opinion regarding the 
implementation of the democracy agenda in our country through legal 
procedures based on the constitution. Do not change the dispute on the 
outcome of general elections into a political conflict, especially the 
conflict among the supporters of leaders. In the event that there is a 
difference of opinion regarding the outcome of the general elections, as 
being experienced by the candidates for President and Vice-President, 
Mr. Wiranto and Mr. Salahuddin Wahid, take this problem to the 
Constitutional Court. Insya Allah, this court shall provide the justice 
for all parties in order to guide our national life to the legal procedures 
so that the democratic system that we develop may run appropriately 
and justly. 
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Judi ial Review c
   In relation to judicial review, up to now, there are more than 100 
applications having been received by the Constitutional Court. However, the 
qualified ones number only 41 applications. 20 of these applications have 
been settled and decided properly, while the other 13 cases have been 
investigated to the trial investigation stage, therefore, within a short period, 
it is fair to state that these cases will too have been determined. The 
remaining 8 cases are still at the preliminary stage of investigation. 
   Among the cases of Judicial Review, the approved applications include 
three cases: 
 
1. Case No. 011-017/PUU-I; 2003 regarding Judicial Review of Law No. 
12 of 2003 on the General Elections which was an application by a 
former member of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). 
2. Case No. 013/PUU-I/2003 regarding Judicial Review of Law No. 16 of 
2003 on Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Terrorism. 
3. Case No. 05/PUU-I/2003 regarding Judicial Review of Law No. 32 of 
2002 on Broadcasting. 
 
   The above three cases have been published in the State Gazette, each 
of them numbered No. 18/2004 and dated 2 March 2004, No. 61/2004 and 
dated 30 July 2004, and No. 63/2004 and dated 6 August 2004, respectively. 
According to the author, based on the above data, it can be noted that the 
verdict of the Constitutional Court in the cases of verification where the 
submissions of the applicant have been upheld number just three cases. 
However, since the substance of the cases relate to principles, the three cases, 
especially the ones submitted by the former member of the PKI and the 
Terrorism case, have resulted in intense reactions among the general public 
and among legal scholars. 
   Other than these three cases, the other cases were rejected in their 
entirety or declared unable to proceed (niet ontuankelijke werklaad) due to 
various reasons. This fact is sufficient to show that it is not very easy for the 
Constitutional Court to approve an application if it is not supported by 
adequate proof according to the basic norms contained in our Constitution. 
Moreover, each case submitted to the Constitutional Court, either the ones 
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 relating to law verification and those relating to the other four aspect of 
authority are not simple cases. 
   Every law which has been ratified, intrinsically has reflected the 
demand of the majority of the Indonesian people, because the House of 
Representatives and President that have jointly discussed and approved it. 
And it is indeed these institutions that receive a direct mandate from the 
people to carry out their duties to legislate and enforce the law. However, the 
law only reflects the political will of the House of Representatives and 
President, which may not be guaranteed to be consistent with the will of all 
sovereign people. The will of the whole people is reflected in the Constitution 
as the product of the People's Consultative Assembly as the people’s 
consultative institution, and not reflected in laws which by the very nature 
only reflect the political will of the House of Representatives and the 
President. 
   The outcome of agreement in the political forum at the House of 
Representatives is determined on the basis of ‘rule by majority’ which should 
not contradict with the values and norms of justice which has the higher 
degree, contained in the constitution. Therefore, while the majority of people 
have demanded a legal norm which is binding to the public as specified in a 
law, if the institution protecting the Constitution in this case the 
Constitutional Court measures it in terms of the process of justice as 
something that contradicts the constitution, then the legal norm may be 
declared to be not binding on the public. However, the vote of the majority 
based on the democratic principle may not then ignore the democratic 
principles upon which it is based, although it is only supported by the vote of 
the minority. Eventually, it is the vote of the minority that really reflects the 
vote of all sovereign people.32
   It is similar to other cases within the scope of authority of the Court. 
They all constitute the most serious cases for our state and nation, the 
verification of which requires carefulness, rational and objective attitudes, 
and a distinctive statesman attitude by prioritizing the national interest 
before any other interest, to maintain integrity, independence, and 
impartiality in verifying and deciding every case.33
   In relation to the above explanation, Jimly Asshiddiqie34 invited all 
law upholders in our country: 
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   “We jointly reinforce our determination, not only by words, but also 
real action that law and justice may indeed be upheld, starting from 
the upholding of the constitution as the highest law. The law and 
constitution should be able to determine and provide direction for the 
dynamics of political, social, and economic life of our nation. The 
dynamics of political, social, and economic life should run 
appropriately on the right rails and within the legal corridors. While 
we know the adagium in the circle of lawyers stating that “uphold 
justice, despite the sky falling”, then we may complete these words 
with “The sky will never fall only because we uphold the law and 
justice. Therefore, uphold the law and justice without any hesitancy”. 
 
  
    In the abovementioned quote, Jimly Asshiddiqie, notes that it is 
certainly not easy to implement this lofty determination. We all are ordinary 
persons, then we are supposed to open ourselves for all possible criticisms 
and inputs from everywhere, solely for the benefit of developing an institution 
that is really respectable due to its effective, efficient, and reliable 
performance in accomplishing all mandates of the Constitution so that our 
country will be more prosperous as a democratic law-based country 
(demoeratisehe rechtsstaat) and also as a democratic country based on law 
(constitutional democracy). Therefore, the Constitutional Court may always 
increase its dedication as the protector of the constitution and guide legal 
procedures for the process of democratization within the more prestigious 
national life.35 
 
Reinforcement of Democracy through the Constitutional Court 
   For the author, in the perspective of democracy, the authority of the 
Constitutional Court may be considered as the reinforcement of values and 
principles of democracy as follows. First, the freedom of association and 
negotiation, which is reflected in, for instance, the application for material 
verification (judicial review) of Law No. 7/2004 on Water Resources. This 
action was brought to the Constitutional Court by more than 30 organizations 
and almost 1000 individuals on 10 May 2004. The Law on Water Resources is 
considered by many to contradict with the 1945 Constitution, specifically 
constitutionally guaranteed human rights.36
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    Second, equality before the law. This value is covered in five matters 
as the authority of Constitutional Court. It means that an individual,  state 
institution, government, and people’s representative body, according to the 
problems they may face, have an equal opportunity and right in submitting a 
case to the Constitutional Court. 
   Third, the control against authority. The Constitutional Court 
(judicative), through the complaint submitted by the House of 
Representatives (legislative), may always become the court for the President 
and/or Vice President (executive) who are alleged to have committed acts of 
corruption and no longer meets the qualifications to be President or Vice-
President. This authority serve as a real form from the distribution of three 
authorities which have been acknowledged earlier; judicative, legislative, and 
executive (trias politika) as the pillars of democracy.37 In the abovementioned 
context, the “Existence of the Constitutional Court in a law-based country 
such as Indonesia should be able to protect the constitution, to guarantee the 
checks and balances among the state institutions, to control the state 
decision-making process, and to control fundamental rights.38
 
The Constitutional Court as the Final Solution 
   The constitution of a country is a reflection of the will of all sovereign 
people, while the Law is only the political will of the People Representatives 
and Government. Although they are institutions elected by people and they 
reflect the vote of majority of people, but if the law contains norms which 
contradict with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court as the institution 
protecting the Constitution is provided with the authority necessary to 
declare it to be not binding on the public.39
   The establishment of the Constitutional Court is also intended to 
provide legal procedures to overcome any problems relating to the outcome of 
general elections, which is recognized by all humankind as the main pillar in 
a modern democratic system. In the event that there is any difference of 
opinion regarding the count of votes among the electorate with the organizer 
of an independent general election, then the Constitutional Court will act as 
the first and final instance court in order to provide a final and binding 
verdict. Through a justice mechanism of this type, the divergence of opinion 
regarding the outcome of a general election will not change into a political 
conflict rather it is managed objectively and rationally as a law-related 
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 dispute which must also be settled legally. In relation to the abovementioned 
explanation, Jimly Asshiddidqie said: “Properly make use of the existence of 
constitutional justice mechanism provided by our Constitution, and whenever 
the final and binding decision has been imposed by the Constitutional Court 
through an objective, rational, open and impartial means for the benefit of 
legal truth, then the decision will become the final solution with all respect 
and obedience, in accordance with our desire to achieve the legal principle as 
the commander. In this way, we should always develop the strong 
constitutional state tradition, in which the political, economic and social 
lifestyle of our nation will always move along the legal rails and corridors 
provided for by our constitution.40
   As a law-based nation (rechtstaat), the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia requires that the President and Vice-President as the leaders of the 
nation perform acts of governmental authority according to the Constitution. 
The President and Vice-President should be able to become the model of 
obedience and adherence to the law. They are directly elected by the people 
because they meet the criteria to become the President and/or Vice President.  
If the President and/or Vice President breach the law or no longer meets the 
qualification according to the Constitution, then the President and/or Vice 
President may be dismissed by the People's Consultative Assembly based on 
the proposal of House of Representatives after obtaining a verdict from the 
Constitutional Court. Furthermore, for candidate Presidents and Vice-
Presidents to become the President and Vice President in the general election 
shall be decided as a pair of elected candidates and later we will be able to 
remind that the oath that you both will declare is as  follows : In the name of 
Allah, I take an oath to meet all my obligation as the President/Vice 
President of Republic of Indonesia properly and justly, to abide by the 
Constitution and adhere to all Laws and their regulations honestly, as well as 
to dedicate myself to the State and Nation.”.41
  
Constitutional Court Perfo m the Judicial Review r
   The amendment of the 1945 Constitution has mandated a major 
change in the state administration system of Indonesia, particularly the 
establishment of the Constitutional Court as a state institution having the 
right to perform judicial review of laws that are deemed to be in breach of the 
1945 Constitution. Judicial review against the law has a significant meaning, 
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 because up to now (prior to the establishment of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Indonesia), the legislation called the law has a very powerful 
position, it can be said to be sacred, which may only be deprived or changed 
by the founding institution, the President and the House of Representatives. 
   In the Law on the Constitutional Court, it is specified that the party 
which may submit the application for judicial review against a law is the 
party whose constitutional right is injured.42, or at least an interest where 
there is a real potential for that interest to be injured due to the existence of a 
law. This is the beginning of desacralization of law as well as the pillar of 
protection of citizens against the arbitrary actions of the state. In another 
sense, it can be said as a national “awareness to create and perform a 
mechanism of self-control”. 
   Capital is proved to be the determinant element in the structure of 
authority. Without a strong desire of the state, represented in the appearance 
of legislative, executive, and judicative institutions to establish and 
accomplish the goals of the welfare state, then the law of Indonesia is 
involved in the pro-market ideology. Then, it has achieved a liberalization 
and privatization in almost every sector, starting from education, electricity, 
fuel, drinking water, privatization of BUMN (State-owned Enterprises), and 
many others. 
   Law may not create happiness anymore! The intrinsic concept of law 
as the guarantor of individual rights so that we may run a fair life and a life 
equal with other individuals has been ignored, particularly the fair life which 
offers a sense of equality before the law. Conversely, what we may find today, 
the law is created (not arranged) in order to guarantee the freedom for 
certain individuals only, homo homini lupus.43
   It is in this non-conducive law environment that the Constitutional 
Court was established, burdened with moral responsibility to correct any 
deviation. The authority provided by the 1945 Constitution to the 
Constitutional Court in order to perform judicial review may result in the 
cancellation and deprivation of law as the strategic authority in achieving the 
welfare state. 
   Various processes of modification on the basic law are actually the 
efforts of all components of the nation in order to improve the quality of life of 
the nation through the development of an innovative law system. The law 
system itself should be developed by involving the factors of legal substance, 
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 information systems, and leadership of the legal apparatus. The factor of 
leadership should be specified separately beyond the legal institution, 
because inside that there is an individual role for the legal apparatus which 
is very influential on the performance of law as a system.44
   Every verdict by the Constitutional Court is indeed final and binding 
in nature. Nevertheless, the academic debate relating to the substance of the 
verdict is to be considered an academic freedom. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
   Through the accommodation of the Constitutional Court, it will 
automatically have a significant effect on the pattern of the relationship of 
state institutions and traditions of state administration that has been the 
norm up to now.  The existence of the Constitutional Court should be 
welcomed, with an expectation that this institution will be able to support the 
process of systematic democratization and political culture, to accomplish the 
checks and balances in state administration, and to fill the gap where the 
community perceives that there is a lack of justice, which has for a long time 
been bound by the authoritarianism and abuse of power of past regimes. 
Nevertheless, the conceptualization of the Constitutional Court in the 
Constitution cannot be said to be perfect, it still leaves some principal and 
conceptual problems.45
   There are some regulations of the Constitutional Court in the 
Constitution which are problematic, and they may affect the process of 
formulation or regulation of the Constitutional Court in the form of law. Some 
of these problems are relating to the position, authority, and recruitment of 
judges for the Constitutional Court. 
   The existence of Constitutional Court as an executive of judicial power 
(judicative) in addition to the Supreme Court has provided for an expectation 
that there will be greater encouragement for enforcement of the principle of 
the supremacy of the law and the development of a democratic governmental 
system. Furthermore, the stipulations in the Constitution should be further 
specified and established in the form of law, especially those relating to the 
position, functions, judges, and procedures. Therefore, it can be clearly 
identified how the Constitutional Court is to perform its functions. 
Considering, that the Constitutional Court is a new institution and 
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 established with a strategic role, the arrangement of its law requires a 
process of socialization and participation. Through this process, the existence 
of an institution will be more legitimate and may function at an optimum 
level. 
   At present, we need very much the enforcement of law that is really 
able to provide certainty and a sense of justice. In the perspective of 
democracy, the law shall not only impose a sanction for those committing a 
crime, but also serve as power of balance for the performance of authority. 
Legal power or judicative power positioned autonomously and with 
equivalence and supported by a strong authority to perform as a control 
against the authority held by the executive and legislative is a necessity. The 
function of control is intended to provide protection for the constitutional 
rights against the possible deviation committed by other authority. It is also 
expected to be able to serve as a bridge in settling any disputes arising 
between the branches of authority on the basis of the Constitution. Based on 
this perspective, the function of judicative authority is very vital, not only for 
the enforcement of law supremacy, but also as the characteristic of a 
democratic state. 
   In does not mean that the authority is not necessary, because without 
authority, the state will not be able to effectively perform its duties. However, 
the authority should be controlled and the effective instrument for controlling 
the authority is the Constitution. 
   In a state adopting the concept of peoples’ sovereignty (democracy) 
such as Indonesia, the state’s authority should be limited in order to protect 
human rights and the instrument deemed to be most effective is the 
Constitution. In the concept of a democratic state, the constitution will 
contain the authorities and duties of the rulers, the rights of those being 
ruled, and the relationship between the rulers and those being ruled. The 
existence of the term constitutional democracy is the political concept of this 
century and is a reflection of the eagerness to achieve the adherence of people 
sovereignty to the constitution. Democracy should be ignored by the 
constitution. 
 
   May Indonesia become a more prosperous nation as a law-based 
democratic state (Democratische rechstaat) and as a Democratic State which 
is based on the law (constitutional democracy). 
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NOTES 
 
1 This decree was achieved in the 7th Plenary Session of MPR (People’s 
Consultative Assembly) of the Republic of Indonesia (2nd continuation) of the 
annual session of the MPR RI dated 9 November 2001. With the condition 
that it means that there has been a principal change in the state 
administration system in Indonesia. If, prior to the occurrence of the third 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the juridical authority does not have an 
authority to judge, verify and annul the stipulation contained in a Law if it 
contradicts with constitutional norms. 
 
2 Even, long before that, namely in the post Dutch colonial period in 
Indonesia, the judges in their verdicts, have performed the judgment and 
verification on the regulation (Law) issued by the colonial government in 
Indonesia and have annulled it if it is in contradiction with the Law of the 
Dutch. See S.M Amin, Indonesia Di Bawah Rezim Demokrasi Terpimpin 
(Jakarta: Publisher: Djambatan, 1998) pp. 216-217). 
 
3 The 1945 Constitution was effective for the first time on 18 August 1945 
through the establishment of United States of the Republic of Indonesia by 
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 virtue of 1949 RIS Constitution on 17 August 1949 and was effective for the 
second time since the issuance of Presidential Decree dated 5 July 1959 up to 
the occurrence of third amendment of 1945 Constitution in 2001. 
 
4 Based on the stipulation in Article 26 Law No. 14 of 1970, the Supreme 
Court has the power to declare the legislation as being illegal for regulations 
at a level lower than Law, which means that the Supreme Court has only the 
authority to verify the regulation under the Law and not to verify the Law 
against the Constitution. 
 
5 Indonesia, The 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia, Article 24C; 
 
6 Based on the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the deadline for 
establishing the Law of the Constitutional Court is 16 August 2003 and prior 
to the establishment of Constitutional Court on the specified date, 
temporarily, all authorities, including the one to verify the Law is undertaken 
by the Supreme Court (Article III of Transitional Provisions of the 1945 
Constitution) as the result of the Fourth Amendment in 2002, saying that the 
Constitutional Court is to be established no later than 16 August 2003. Prior 
to the establishment, all its authorities are undertaken by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
7 Interview with Mr.  Adnan Buyung Nasution on Tuesday, 1 December 2005. 
 
8 Doctrine of constitutional supremacy as the foundation to justify the 
analysis of Law against the Constitution by the juridical body was developed 
by John Marshall in labor legal practice and by Hans Kelsen in Europe when 
he was asked to arrange the Austrian Constitution in 1920. See Eric 
Barendts. op. cit page 20-21; and Alex Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges, 
Constitutional Politics in Europe, op. cit pp. 9-11. 
 
9 According to Adnan Buyung Nasution, both Yamin and Soepono demanded 
that the state that must be established is a people sovereignty state which is 
based on law. However, both of them have different opinions as to whether 
this people sovereignty will be based on the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy (Law) or based on the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. This 
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 difference actually triggered the refusal by Soepono of the proposal of Yamin 
regarding the verification of Law by juridical bodies. Yamin demanded that 
people sovereignty should be based on Constitutional supremacy. Therefore, 
the product of Law should be verified by the Supreme Court with regards to 
whether it contradicts or not the Constitution. Whereas, Soepomo demanded 
that people sovereignty should be based on the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy. Therefore, the Law as the product of parliament should be 
verified by the Constitutional Court; based on an interview with Adnan 
Buyung Nasution, Jakarta, 1 December 2005. The doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy the as foundation for justifying the analysis against the 
Constitution by the juridical body was developed by John Marshall in the 
state law practice of the USA and by Hans Kelsen in Europe when asked to 
arrange the Austrian Constitution in 1920. See Eric Barendt, op. cit. pp. 20-
21; and Alec Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges, Constitutional Politics in 
Europe, op. cit. pp. 9-11. 
 
10 Interview with Adnan Buyung Nasution, loc. cit. 
 
11 See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies, Constitutional 
Courts in Asia Cases (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 1. 
 
12 See Muhammad Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Publisher Djambatan, 1952) pp. 58-59, compare with Jonathan 
Riley, Imagining Another Madisonian Republic, in John Farejohn, op. cit. p. 
194, Agresto, op. cit, p. 45; Ervind Smith, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review 
of Legislation – A Comparative Approach, in Ervind Smith, Ed., 
Constitutional Justice Under Old Constitutions; op. cit. pp. 365-366; and 
Ginsburg, op cit. pp. 1-2. 
 
13 Democratic systems are not systems that may always guarantee the truth, 
justice, policy, even by the principle of majority or negotiation, vox populi, vox 
ded (The voice of people is the voice of God) which is frequently used by 
people in struggling for democracy but it is a slogan only. Frequently, 
precisely the truth is voiced by a single voice or minority voice. See the 
complete explanation regarding this matter in J. Soedjati Djiwandono, 
Setengah Abad Negara Pancasila, (Jakarta: CSIS, 1995), pp. 35-37. 
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14 In England, the Law may not be disturbed because in that state, 
parliamentary supremacy (the sovereignty of parliament) is recognized, 
whereas in France, the principle of Law may not be disturbed because in this 
state, it consistently applies a trias politica system. If the court is provided 
with an authority to verify the Law, it means that the judicial body interferes 
with the political affairs and this contradicts the doctrine of Tris Politica. See 
Dicey, “The Law of the Constitution,” op. cit. pp. 3-4. See also the explanation 
of Bagir Manan before the PAH 1 of Badan Pekerja MPR which discusses and 
negotiates the design of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, see the 9th, 
Session Treatise of PAH I Badan Pekerja MPR, on December 16th, 1999 in the 
MPR RI, Buku Kedua Ayat 3A (Jakarta: Secretariat General of MPR RI, 2000, 
p. 419. 
 
15 Jufrina Rizal and Agus Brotosusilo, Legal Philosophy, 1st Book, 
Postgraduate Program, Faculty of Law of Universitas Indonesia, only used 
within the Faculty of Law at the Universitas Indonesia, August 2003, pp. 87-
89. 
 
16 Adnan Buyung Nasution, op. cit. 
 
17 See, Agreso, loc. cit., John Marshall; loc. cit. and Hamilton, loc. cit. 
 
18 The quality of a Law is determined by the extent to which the rules 
contained in the Law are in line with the imperatives contained in the 
Constitution as its standard or cornerstone. Hans Kelsen, besides 
emphasizing the constitution as the highest legal norm in a state, in which all 
branches of state power should abide by, it also establishes a constitutional 
court in order to judge and analyze whether the state administrators 
established by the constitution including the legislative authority branch 
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